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Perhaps the most memorable pop-culture image of the American 
political system is that of Jimmy Stewart staging a valiant, one-man 
filibuster against a corrupt Senate in the film Mr. Smith Goes to Washington.  
Stewart’s character used the filibuster as the rock to slay the Goliath 
majority.  Surprisingly, that image extends beyond motion pictures; very few 
political scientists have ever questioned the mythical powers of the filibuster.  
Most scholars simply assume that the Framers of the Constitution designed 
the filibuster as a way to further deliberation when used for noble causes, as 
Senator Smith did.  But is that assumption correct?  Unfortunately, the word 
filibuster did not exist in 1787.  Therefore, one must piece together this 
puzzle using a variety of sources.  The filibuster is inconsistent with the 
vision of the Senate expressed by the Framers in the Constitution, the 
Federalist Papers, and early congressional history. 
It is first necessary to give some background information about the 
filibuster and the limitations thereupon.  The term filibuster originated from 
a Dutch word, meaning “free booty.”1  Eventually, it became known as a 
pirate, robber, or someone who engages in unauthorized or irregular warfare.  
By the mid 19th century, the term adopted its modern legislative definition.  
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Political scientist Franklin Burdette defines the filibuster as “dilatory tactics 
used upon the floor of a legislative body…in order to defeat legislation or 
force unwilling adoption as a price for time to consider other and perhaps 
much more important measures.”2  Dilatory tactics are not limited to holding 
the floor of the Senate for an extended period of time; other means of 
filibustering include offering numerous amendments and repeatedly making 
procedural motions and quorum calls.3 
The original standing rules of the Senate placed no time limits upon 
debate.  In fact, until 1917 no procedural safeguards existed to protect the 
Senate from a filibuster.  In 1917, the Senate adopted the cloture rule (Rule 
22), which allows a supermajority to close debate.  After several amendments, 
today Rule 22 applies to motions to proceed to a bill, amendments, final 
passage of bills, and conference reports.  The mechanics of the cloture rule 
are quite intricate.  Any senator must collect 16 signatures on a cloture 
petition, which he or she files with the presiding officer.  Two legislative days 
later, the motion for cloture is ripe for a vote.  If three-fifths of the Senate 
support the cloture motion, debate may continue on the original bill, 
amendment, or motion for 30 hours.  Each senator may speak for up to one 
hour until the 30 hours expire.  In addition to limiting debate, Rule 22 also 
places limits on amendments.  After a cloture petition is filed with the 
presiding officer, senators may only offer germane amendments.  Senators 
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must file primary and secondary amendments in advance by a certain 
deadline.4 
 Defenders of the filibuster make several arguments that require 
refutation.  The first argument is the notion that the Framers of the 
Constitution desired to protect the rights of the minority.  The legendary 
senator Thomas Hart Benton asserted in 1851, “Senators have a 
constitutional right to speak to the subject before the House, there is no 
power anywhere to stop them.”5  However, the evidence from the Constitution 
does not support this claim.  Article I does not make any procedural 
guarantees to minorities in the Senate, with the exception that a one-fifth 
majority may ask for votes to be recorded in the journal.  Conversely, some 
senators even interpret this clause to hinder minority rights by cutting off 
debate and taking a recorded vote, effectively ending a filibuster with only a 
tiny majority.  In 1915, Senator Robert Owen of Oklahoma argued that this 
“Yeas and Nays” provision means that one-fifth of the Senate has the right 
“to demand the immediate taking of the yeas and nays on any question 
pending and the record of that vote in the journal of the Senate.”6  
Overall, the Constitution is relatively silent on procedure.  Article I 
Section 5 states in very simple terms, “Each House may determine the Rules 
of its Proceedings.”  Although this does not preclude the Framer’s support of 
the filibuster, there is considerable evidence that points to the contrary.  The 
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Constitution contains six procedural references: the tie breaking vote of the 
vice president, a two-thirds vote for conviction on impeachment charges, a 
simple majority for a quorum, a two-thirds majority for expulsion of a 
member of Congress, the “Yeas and Nays” clause, and a two-thirds 
requirement to override a presidential veto.7  The fact that half of these 
provisions deal with supermajorities shows that the Framers wanted to limit 
the number of cases in which majority rule should not prevail.  Under this 
philosophy, if the Framers had considered the filibuster to be such an 
important right for minorities, it would be logical that a supermajority 
provision for cloture would exist in the Constitution as a fourth exception to 
majority rule. 
During the Constitutional Convention, very little debate involved 
discussions of procedural provisions.  In fact, the Framers passed the 
provision allowing each chamber of Congress to pass its own procedural rules 
by voice vote, without any opposition.8  The only remarkable debate over a 
procedural matter occurred over the “Yeas and Nays” clause.  In contrast to 
Senator Owen’s perspective (mentioned above), other scholars view this 
clause as a constitutionally sanctioned dilatory tactic – that is, a minority of 
senators can delay action on legislation by repeatedly forcing recorded votes 
on procedural questions.  At the Constitutional Convention, delegate 
Gouverneur Morris introduced the “Yeas and Nays” clause, but he wanted a 
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vote to be entered in the record at the demand of only one member.  Many 
delegates objected because it gave an individual member of Congress too 
much power.  Nathaniel Gorham stated that a similar and much-abused 
device in Massachusetts resulted “in stuffing the journals with them on 
frivolous occasions.”9  Instead, the Framers agreed on a compromise and set 
the vote requirement at a one-fifth level.  This debate demonstrates the 
caution the Framers took in dealing with minority rights. 
An examination of history further supports this philosophy.  The 
Articles of Confederation mandated a two-thirds majority to perform the 
most important governmental functions such as: declaring war, entering 
treaties, coining money, or spending or borrowing funds.  Furthermore, 
amendments to the Articles required unanimous consent from both the 
Congress and all 13 state legislatures.10  These supermajoritarian 
requirements hampered the ability of the Congress to govern effectively, and 
ultimately led to the call for a new constitution.  The Framers realized this 
problem, and came down hard upon supermajoritarian rule in the Federalist 
Papers.  James Madison in Federalist 58 writes, 
It has been said that more than a majority ought to have been 
required for a quorum; and in particular cases, if not in all, more than 
a majority of a quorum for a decision.  That some advantages might 
have resulted from such a precaution, cannot be denied.  It might 
have been an additional shield to some particular interests, and 
another obstacle generally to hasty and partial measures.  But these 
considerations are outweighed by the inconveniences in the opposite 
scale.  In all cases where justice or the general good might require 
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new laws to be passed, or active measures to be pursued, the 
fundamental principle of government would be reversed.  It would be 
no longer the majority that would rule: the power would be 
transferred to the minority.11 
 
Proponents of the filibuster point elsewhere in the Federalist Papers 
and argue that the filibuster is a useful check on majority tyranny.  Although 
the Framers drastically feared the “violence of faction,” the weapons to fight 
faction did not include strengthening minority rights.  In the legendary 
Federalist 10, Madison argues that the representative system of government 
will yield wiser rulers who can truly discern the public good.  Madison also 
argues that the size of the United States will minimize the number of 
representatives over which a faction may gain control.  However, Madison 
hardly makes any mention of minority rights as a means of checking majority 
tyranny.  The only time a Madison considers minorities, he simply states, “If 
a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican 
principle, which enables a majority to defeat its sinister views by regular 
vote.”12   
One can draw two conclusions from this statement.  First, Madison 
believes in a “regular vote,” the very thing that a filibuster prevents.  This 
comment implies that obstructionist tactics that delay the possibility of 
voting, even if used against a majority faction, would be contrary to 
Madison’s vision.  Second, strengthening minority rights would increase the 
violence of faction because it gives more groups of representatives the 
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weapons to create “instability, injustice, and confusion.”13  The modern 
American political system suffers from the effects of hyperpluralism, a theory 
that holds that there are so many groups with differing political beliefs that 
gridlock is the most likely consequence.14  The 3,844 different political action 
committees currently in operation demonstrate this theory.15  With the 
filibuster as a weapon, an interest group does not need to persuade 51 
senators to favor their interest.  Instead, interest groups need only to find one 
senator who is willing to filibuster.  This scenario is exactly what Madison 
and Founding Fathers feared the most. 
The next argument that the proponents of the filibuster offer in its 
defense is that the filibuster coincides with the Founding Fathers’ desire for 
the Senate to be a more deliberative body.  In a famous (but historically 
dubious) anecdote, George Washington explains the design of the Senate to 
Thomas Jefferson.  “Why,” asked Washington, “did you pour that coffee into a 
saucer?”  “To cool it,” Jefferson replied.  “Even so,” responded Washington, 
“we pour legislation into the senatorial saucer to cool it.”16  It is true that the 
Framers designed the Senate to be a more deliberative body than the House.  
However, it does not follow that therefore they would approve of the 
filibuster.  The Framers intended to achieve deliberation through 
institutional provisions in the Constitution, not through procedural ones.  
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The characteristics of the Senate that make it different from the House are: 
higher age and citizenship requirements, length of term, staggered elections, 
equal representation among the states, smaller size, original method of 
selection by state legislatures rather than direct election, and exclusive rights 
to consider nominations, treaties, and trial of impeachments.  
Madison argues extensively about three of these characteristics in the 
Federalist Papers.  First, senators must be at least 30 years old, and they are 
subject to a nine-year citizenship requirement, as compared to a 25-year age 
requirement and a seven-year citizenship requirement in the House.17  Such 
provisions, Madison argued in Federalist 62, would ensure that senators had 
a “greater extent of information and stability of character.”18  Second, 
staggered six-year terms for senators – in contrast to the simultaneous two-
year terms for the House – were designed to insulate the Senate from the 
“impulse of sudden and violent passions, and…factious leaders.”19  The 
resulting order and stability not only protects the Senate from corruption 
from the House, but it also serves “as a defence to the people against their 
own temporary errors and delusions.”20 Third, the Senate has equality of 
representation and originally featured appointment by the state legislatures, 
compared to popular representation and election in the House.  These 
characteristics provide “a constitutional recognition of the portion of 
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sovereignty remaining in the individual states,” and made the Senate “an 
instrument for preserving that residual sovereignty.”21  Moreover, by 
equalizing representation, small states could check the ambitions of the 
larger states.  The absence of a defense of unlimited debate in the Federalist 
Papers indicates that the Framers would not approve of a filibuster as a 
means of “cooling” legislation. 
Finally, the vision of deliberation and extended debate envisioned by 
the Framers is not consistent with a correct portrayal of the filibuster.  
Filibustering senators rarely advance a discussion of the merits of legislation.  
In a 1935 filibuster, Senator Huey Long spoke for 15 hours, not just about the 
New Deal legislation under consideration, but also many other subjects, such 
as: the life of Frederick the Great, Roquefort cheese salad dressing, and any 
other topic requested by the exhausted and angry members of the Senate.22  
Sadly, this story represents the norm for a filibuster, even going back to its 
early history.  Senator John Randolph of Virginia, regarded as the first 
filibusterer, gave a speech in 1826, which included discourses of 
Unitarianism, Shakespeare, William the Conqueror, and horses.23  The 
record for the longest single speech in Senate history, a dubious honor, 
belongs to Senator Strom Thurmond, who spoke for 24 hours and 18 minutes 
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against the Civil Rights Act of 1957.24  Such speeches plainly do not qualify 
as substantive discussion of the issues.  In 1870, the Senate established the 
precedent that a senator “may read papers in debate that are irrelevant to 
the subject matter.”25  As a result, modern filibusterers had the advantage of 
being able to read from the phone book to pass the time. 
In designing the Senate, the Framers wanted to differentiate it from 
the House so that it would be more difficult for one branch to accumulate 
supreme power.  “As the improbability of sinister combinations [between the 
House and Senate] will be in proportion to the dissimilarity in the genius of 
the two bodies,” Madison argues in Federalist 62, “[I]t must be politic to 
distinguish them from each other by every circumstance which will consist 
with a due harmony in all proper measures.”26   
However, an examination of early congressional history demonstrates 
that the Framers did not believe that different procedural rules were 
essential to this goal.  In fact, early House and Senate rules were remarkably 
similar.  The committees assigned to draft the first set of rules for each body 
intended to limit a member’s right to speak on their respective chamber 
floors.  The second standing rule in the House requires that a member may 
speak no more than twice on a question.  Similarly, the fourth rule of the 
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Senate prohibits a senator from speaking more than twice on the same 
question on the same day.27 
Both chambers initially possessed a procedural weapon to cut off 
debate immediately with a simple majority – the previous question motion.  
In modern parliamentary procedure, approval of this motion brings the 
chamber to an immediate vote on the underlying bill or amendment; its 
defeat allows for prolonged debate.28  However, in the early Senate, a senator 
who wanted to delay discussion of sensitive and delicate topics would make 
the motion and hope it would fail.  The second presiding officer of the Senate, 
then-Vice President Thomas Jefferson wrote this archaic interpretation of 
previous question into his manual of parliamentary procedure for the Senate 
in 1801.  The motion eventually became abused as a dilatory tactic, which 
caused the Senate to remove it in 1806.29   Nonetheless, this interpretation 
persists to this day in Jefferson’s Manual.30  It appears that the Senate 
embraced the principle of extended debate by eliminating previous question.  
However, the Senate almost never used previous question for its modern 
function.  Instead, the Senate removed previous question because that motion 
itself had become a means of wasting time.  It is ironic that early filibustering 
tactics included repeated use of the one motion that eventually became the 
means of ending a filibuster. 
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In 1811, the House revamped its motion to previous question in order 
to make it a weapon to cut off debate.  That decision reflects the explosion of 
partisanship and the persistent obstructionism by the Federalist minority 
over the impending war with England.31  In fact, obstructionist tactics were 
typical in the House long before they became common in the Senate,32 thus 
the House needed this safeguard first.  In the early Senate, filibusters and 
intense partisanship simply did not exist.  In addition, there was no need to 
cut off debate when the chamber and the workload were relatively small.  
The early Senate was mainly a revisory body; senators did not initiate much 
legislation at all.33  Because there was little rush to finish pressing business, 
the Senate could simply wait out any obstructionist senators.34  By the end of 
the nineteenth century, however, the Senate’s size, workload, and importance 
increased.  Senators began taking advantage of parliamentary procedure to 
suit their political interests.  
The filibuster is inconsistent with the vision of the Senate expressed by 
the Framers in the Constitution, the Federalist Papers, and early 
congressional history.  Alexander Hamilton perhaps best summarizes the 
view of the Framers in Federalist 22, writing,  
To give a minority a negative upon the majority is in its tendency to subject 
the sense of the greater number to that of the lesser number…The necessity 
of unanimity in public bodies, or of something approaching towards it, has 
been formed upon a supposition that it would contribute to security.  But its 
real operation is to embarrass the administration, to destroy the energy of 
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government, and to substitute the pleasure, caprice, or artifices of an 
insignificant, turbulent or corrupt junto, to the regular deliberations and 
decisions of a respectable majority.35   
 
Despite the Founding Fathers disdain for minority rule, I do not 
conclude that the filibuster should therefore be eliminated.  It is possible to 
reform the filibuster so that it protects extended debate without legislative 
hijacking.  Extended can contribute positively to the legislative process.  It 
can further discussion of important issues, incorporate new perspectives into 
legislation, educate the public, and give time to build consensus and 
compromise.   
The ideal goal of filibuster reform is to enact a simple majority cloture, 
similar to the previous question motion used in the House.  Unfortunately, 
however, such an action simply will not occur in today’s Senate.  The last 
attempt at majority cloture in 1995 failed by a vote of 76 to 19, despite some 
very conciliatory language in the proposal.36  Ironically, Rule 22 insulates 
itself against revision.  Whereas cloture in normal situations requires a vote 
of 60 senators, cloture on a proposal to amend the rules of the Senate 
requires the support of 67 senators.37  Thus, any attempt to eliminate the 
filibuster is itself subject to an unusually overwhelming filibuster.   
Even if significant cloture reform were enacted, the underlying 
problem remains unresolved: senators are willing to endure the costs of a 
filibuster so that the practice still exists for them to utilize in the future for 
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their agenda.  Therefore, instead of making cloture easier, a better method of 
reform would be to make the filibuster tougher to endure.  By making the 
filibuster a more grueling experience, senators hopefully would reserve it for 
extreme situations and noble purposes, such as those portrayed on screen by 
Senator Smith.  The specifics of such a reform, however, are beyond the scope 
of this analysis.  I firmly believe that a tamed filibuster would return the 
Senate to the balance of majoritarian rule and deliberation envisioned by the 
Founding Fathers.  
 
